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CASE NOTE 
Administrative Law-GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS-PUBLIC UTILI- 
TIES SUPPLYING SERVICES TO GOVERNMENT AGENCIES ARE GOVERN- 
MENT CONTRACTORS SUBJECT O NONDISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS OF 
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11,246-United States v. New Orleans Public 
Service, Inc., 553 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1977), petition for cert. filed, 
46 U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Sept. 30, 1977) (No. 77-497). 
For many years New Orleans Public Service, Inc., (NOPSI) 
has supplied electricity and natural gas to various governmental 
agencies in and around New Orleans.' In 1973 the United States 
Department of Justice brought an action to compel NOPSI, a 
public utility, to comply with the contractual obligations im- 
posed by Executive Order 11,2462 and the rules and regulations 
issued pursuant t h e r e t ~ . ~  Executive Order 11,246 prohibits em- 
ployment discrimination by government contractors and requires 
that they take affirmative action to ensure equal employment 
~pportunity.~ The Order also requires a contractor to keep exten- 
sive employment records and to file those records with the con- 
tracting agency or Secretary of Labor .5 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Louisiana held that NOPSI was a government contractor and was 
therefore subject to the obligations imposed by the Executive 
Order and its implementing rules and  regulation^.^ The court 
issued an order enjoining the utility from failing to comply with 
Executive Order 11,246.' The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that a public utility which has 
a local monopoly on the sale of natural gas or electricity and 
which sells energy to the federal government can be required to 
1. United States v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d 459,462 (5th Cir. 1977), 
petition for cert. filed, 46U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Sept. 30,1977) (No. 77-497). In 1973 NOPSI 
supplied federal users with more than $2,680,000 worth of electrical and natural gas 
service. Id. at 462. 
2. 3 C.F.R. 173 (1973), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e app., a t  10,294 (1970) (original 
version at 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation)). 
3. 41 C.F.R. 6 60-1 (1976), as amended by 42 Fed. Reg. 3457 (1977). See note 32 and 
accompanying text infra. 
4. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 5 202,3 C.F.R. 173 (l973), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e 
app., at 10,294 (1970). 
5. Id. 5 203. 
6. United States v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. fi 9795, 8 Fair 
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1089 (E.D. La. 1974), aff'd, 553 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1977), petition for 
cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Sept. 30, 1977) (No. 77-497). 
7. Id. a t  6331, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1106-07. 
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comply with the equal opportunity obligations of Executive Order 
11,246, even though the utility has not expressly consented to be 
bound by the Order? 
A. Nondiscrimination Provisions i n  Executive Orders 
In response to mounting pressure from civil rights groupsg 
and because of an acute shortage of labor in the defense indus- 
tries, President Roosevelt in 1941 issued Executive Order 8802.1° 
The Order required that all procurement contracts related to de- 
fense contain a clause prohibiting the contractor from discrimi- 
nating against any worker because of race, creed, color, or na- 
tional origin." Executive Order 9001 reaffirmed the objectives of 
Order 8802 and further provided that where a nondiscrimination 
clause is not expressly contained in a defense contract, it will 
nevertheless be deemed to be incorporated by reference.12 Execu- 
tive Order 9346, issued in 1943, substantially expanded this cov- 
erage by requiring the inclusion of the nondiscrimination provi- 
sion in contracts entered into by all contracting government agen- 
cies and by specifically directing that government contractors, in 
turn, include the clause in all related  subcontract^.^^ Subsequent 
executive orders issued by Presidents Truman and Eisenhower 
did not diminish these requirements.14 
The expansive trend of former executive pronouncements 
continued when President Kennedy ordered that government 
contractors and contractors engaged in federally assisted con- 
struction projects take affirmative action to ensure equal employ- 
ment opportunity.15 The President's Committee on Equal Em- 
8. 553 F.2d at 461. While the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, 
the injunction against NOPSI was lifted. The court ruled that the regulations should first 
be enforced administratively and that the district court's injunctive powers should be 
invoked only when administrative remedies fail. Id. at 474. 
In considering NOPSI, the Court of Appeals joined the case with United States v. 
Mississippi Power & Light Co., 553 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1977). While the factual background 
in Mississippi differs from that in NOPSI, the issues presented in both cases are identical, 
and the court reached similar holdings. 
9. L. RUCHAMES, RACE, JOBS, AND POLITICS 17-21 (1953). 
10. 3 C.F.R. 957 (1938-1943 Compilation). 
11. Id. 
12. Exec. Order No. 9001, tit. II, Q 2, 3 C.F.R. 1054 (1938-1943 Compilation). 
13. Exec. Order No. 9346, 3 C.F.R. 1280 (1938-1943 Compilation). 
14. E.g., Exec. Order No. 10,479, 3 C.F.R. 961 (1949-1953 Compilation); Exec. Order 
No. 10,210, pt. I, fi 7, 3 C.F.R. 390 (1949-1953 Compilation); Exec. Order No. 9664, 3 
C .F.R. 480 (1943-1948 Compilation). 
15. Exec. Order No. 11,114, 3 C.F.R. 774 (1959-1963 Compilation); Exec. Order No. 
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ployment Opportunity (CEEO) was created to administer the 
new requirement and to develop whatever provisions the commit- 
tee deemed necessary to accomplish the purposes of the orders.'" 
In 1965, President Johnson continued the nondiscrimination pro- 
gram through Executive Order 11,246 which abolished the CEEO 
and authorized the Secretary of Labor to adopt appropriate rules 
and regulations relating to the Order.'' Executive Order 11,375 
later extended the nondiscrimination requirement to prohibit sex 
discrimination by government  contractor^.^^ 
B. The Validity of Executive Order 11,246 
1. Executive control over federal procurement 
The federal government has the right to set the terms and 
conditions upon which it will do business.lg In Perkins v .  Lukens 
Steel Co., 20 the Supreme Court stated: "Like private individuals 
and businesses, the Government enjoys the unrestricted power to 
produce its own supplies, to determine those with whom it will 
deal, and to fix the terms and conditions upon which it will make 
needed  purchase^."^^ This statement reflects the generally ac- 
cepted rule which recognizes that the government is entitled to 
those rights accorded any contracting party.22 
The President has been given specific statutory authority 
over federal procurement procedures by 40 U.S.C. Section 
486(a) .23 That authority, when considered with the Perkins dic- 
10,925, § 301, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-1963 Compilation). 
16. Exec. Order No. 10,925, $ 4  101, 103, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-1963 Compilation). 
17. Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 201,3 C.F.R. 174 (1973), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. 4 2000e 
app., at  10,294 (1970) (original version a t  3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation)). The 
Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) assumed the re- 
sponsibility of enforcing compliance with the equal employment provisions. 41 C.F.R. § 
60-1.2 (1976). The Director of the OFCC has the responsibility of "carrying out the respon- 
sibilities assigned to the Secretary under [Executive Order 11,2461, except the power to 
issue rules and regulations of a general nature." Id. 
18. Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 684 (1966-1970 Compilation). 
19. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 740-41 (1964). 
20. 310 U.S. 113 (1940). At issue was the validity of a determination made by the 
Secretary of Labor pursuant to the Public Contracts Act of 1936, 41 U.S.C. $§  35-45 
(1970), which authorized the establishment of a minimum wage standard for government 
suppliers. 
21. 310 U.S. at 127 (dictum). 
22. See Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
404 U.S. 854 (1971); Printing Specialties Local 604 v. Union Camp Corp., 350 F. Supp. 
632 (S.D. Ga. 1972); Southern Ill. Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 327 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D. Ill. 
1971), aff'd, 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1972). 
23. 40 U.S.C. 8 486(a) (1970). This statute is a section of the Federal Property and 
Administrative Service Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-152,63 Stat. 377 (codified in scattered 
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tum, indicates that the President may determine the terms and 
conditions upon which the government will enter into ~ontracts.~" 
2. Judicial approval of Executive Order 11,246 
Executive authority to impose nondiscrimination provisions 
in government contracts has been consistently upheld by the 
courts. Citing the federal government's "vital interest in assuring 
that the largest possible pool of qualified manpower be available 
for the accomplishment of its projects," the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Contractors Association v.  
Secretary of LaboP concluded that inclusion of the nondiscrimi- 
nation provision of Executive Order 11,246 in federal contracts 
was within the implied authority of the P re~ iden t .~~  In Southern 
Illinois Builders Association v.  Ogilvie, 27 a federal district judge 
upheld an affirmative action program imposed by the Governor 
of Illinois pursuant to, inter alia, Executive Order 11,246: "The 
Executive Order and its predecessors have the full force and effect 
of law."28 Other courts have reached similar holdings, and none 
to date have attacked the Order.29 
C. Regulations Issued Pursuant to Executive Order 11,246 
Following the directive of Executive Order 11,246," the Sec- 
retary of Labor has issued rules and regulations to implement its 
 provision^.^^ The regulations specify that the equal opportunity 
clause will be considered a part of every government contract and 
subcontract, whether or not the contract is written and whether 
sections of 5, 15,40, 41, 44 U.S.C.). The purpose of the Act is to "provide for the Govern- 
ment an economical and efficient system for (a) the procurement and supply of personal 
property and nonpersonal services . . . ." Id. 8 2, 40 U.S.C. 5 471 (1970). 
24. The Perkins dictum applies to the government generally. The courts merely use 
40 U.S.C. § 486(a) (1970) as a means of applying the dictum to the President specifically. 
See United States v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d 459, 465-69 (5th Cir. 1977), 
petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Sept. 30, 1977) (No. 77-497). 
25. 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 US.  854 (1971). 
26. Id. a t  171. 
27. 327 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D. Ill. 1971), aff'd, 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1972). 
28. Id. at 1162. 
29. The Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the issue of the Executive 
Order's validity, although in at least one instance certiorari has been denied where the 
lower court ruled in favor of the Order. Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 
159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied. 404 U S .  854 (1971). 
30. Exec. Order 11,246, §§  201, 204-05, 3 C.F.R. 173 (1973), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e app., at 10,294 (1970). 
31. 41 C.F.R. 5 60-1 (1976)' as amended by 42 Fed. Reg. 3457 (1977) and 42 Fed. Reg. 
5978 (1977). 
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or not the clause is physically incorporated in the contract.32 The 
regulations define a government contract as being: 
[Alny agreement or modification thereof between any con- 
tracting agency and any person for the furnishing of supplies or 
services or for the use of real or personal property, including 
lease arrangements. The term "services", as used in this section 
includes, but is not limited to the following services: Utility, 
construction, transportation, research, insurance, and fund de- 
p0sita1-y.~~ 
The regulations indicate certain conditions that may exempt a 
contractor from compliance with the program.34 None of the ex- 
emptions, however, are applicable to NOPSI in the instant case. 
The regulations also provide that the Director of the Office of 
Federal Contract Compliance may institute an administrative 
enforcement proceeding3= or refer the matter to the Department 
of Justice to enforce the contractual provisions of the Order.36 
32. Id. 4  60-1.4(e). The equal opportunity clause which is included in every contract 
reads in part: 
During the performance of this contract, the contractor agrees as follows: 
(1) The contractor will not discriminate against any employee or appli- 
cant for employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The 
contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, 
and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Such action shall include, but not 
be limited to the following: Employment, upgrading, demotion, or transfer, 
recruitment or recruitment advertising; layoff or termination; rates of pay or 
other forms of compensation; a.nd selection for training, including apprentice- 
ship . . . . 
. . . . 
(5) The contractor will furnish all information and reports required by 
Executive Order 11246 of September 24,1965, and by the rules, regulations, and 
orders of the Secretary of Labor, or pursuant thereto, [sic] and will permit 
access to his books, records, and accounts by the contracting agency and the 
Secretary of Labor for purposes of investigation to ascertain compliance with 
such rules, regulations, and orders. 
Id. 8 60-1.4(a). 
33. Id. 8 60-1.3 (emphasis added). 
34. Id. § 60-1.5. These include, for example, instances where work is performed out- 
side the United States by persons not recruited within the United States, id. § 60- 
1.5(a)(3); contracts with state and local governments, id. 4 60-1.5(a)(4); and cases where 
noncompliance is required for national security purposes, id. § 60-1.5(c). 
35. Id. $ 4  60-1.25 to 1.32. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance has the respon- 
sibility of enforcing the equal employment provisions. See note 17 supra. The ultimate 
sanction under administrative enforcement proceedings is debarment of a business from 
any additional government contracts. To date, 14 companies have been debarred, and 
three are awaiting a final debarment proceeding; six companies have debarment proceed- 
ings pending. See [I9771 FED. CONT. REP. (BNA) No. 686, A-9, No. 694, C-1. 
36. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.27 (1976), as amended by 42 Fed. Reg. 3457 (1977) and 42 Fed. 
Reg. 5978 (1977). 
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The instant case presents an issue never before confronted by 
the courts.37 Although the Executive Order refers only to "con- 
tracts" and  contractor^,"^^ the implementing regulations define 
government contracts as including "any agreement or modifica- 
tion thereof . . . for the furnishing of supplies or  service^."^^ 
While NOPSI clearly falls within the coverage of the regulations, 
the question arises whether the utility is a contracting party as 
contemplated by Executive Order 11,246. Unlike previous 
cases," the principal issue in NOPSI is not the validity of the 
Executive Order-rather the instant case involves the scope 
of the Order. The issue presented is whether the Secretary of 
Labor exceeded his rulemaking authority by extending the 
Order's coverage to businesses that have a duty to provide service 
to the government because of a state or local fran~hise.~' 
Reasoning that great deference should be given administra- 
tive interpretations, Judge Ainsworth, writing for the majority, 
found "that the [Labor] Department acted within the scope of 
the Order in applying the Order to NOPSI."42 The court found 
that NOPSI's lack of consent to the provisions would not disallow 
a finding of the necessary contractual re la t i~nship.~~ The fact that 
37. See 553 F.2d at  468. One previously litigated case involved a utility company 
employee whose discrimination suit was based upon, inter alia, the provisions of Executive 
Order 11,246. In that case the district court ruled that the Order did not provide a basis 
for individual complaints. Consequently, the court never reached the issue of whether 
utilities are covered by the Executive Order. Bradford v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 60 
F.R.D. 432 (W.D. Pa. 1973). 
38. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 8 202,3 C.F.R. 173 (1973), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 
app., a t  10,294 (1970). 
39. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.3(m) (1976), as amended by 42 Fed. Reg. 3457 (1977). 
40. Notes 25-29 and accompanying text supra. 
41. The court addressed two issues which are beyond the scope of this Case Note. 
First, NOPSI contended, on the authority of See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), 
that administrative searches conducted in accordance with the Order were unreasonable 
searches and seizures. Brief for Appellant at 20-26. The court distinguished See by noting 
that the holding did not necessarily apply to regulated industries. The court also quoted 
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972), which upheld an unconsented search 
under federal statute of a firearms dealer, stating that in NOPSI, as in Biswell, "the 
possibilities of abuse and the threat to privacy are not of impressive dimensions." 553 F.2d 
at 470-72. 
Second, the court dealt with the issue of enforcement, holding that, while the lower 
court properly found NOPSI to be covered by the Executive Order, "the task of obtaining 
NOPSI's compliance with the program should be left to the Government's own adminis- 
trative compliance processes." Id. See generally notes 8 & 35 supra. 
42. 553 F.2d at  465. 
43. Id. at 468-70. The district court had also ruled that NOPSI executed a contract 
with the government subsequent to the issuance of the Order. The conditions imposed by 
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NOPSI had for many years sold millions of dollars worth of utility 
services to federal agencies was sufficient evidence of such a rela- 
ti~nship.~"The court stated that although utilities operate under 
local franchises, they render "services to individual customers 
pursuant to contracts, whether written or parol, and whether ex- 
plicit or implicit in the parties' course of dealing."45 Of particular 
importance to the majority was the fact that NOPSI enjoyed a 
monopoly, and that to allow NOPSI to prevail in the case would 
force the government to acquiesce since the services provided by 
NOPSI are essential? 
Judge Clark filed a dissent contending that the Executive 
Order refers only to contracts.47 NOPSI, by virtue of the condi- 
tions imposed by its franchise, had a preexisting legal duty to 
perform services for the government, and thus in Judge Clark's 
view there was no genuine contract between the government and 
NOPSI." Since the Order was addressed only to contracts, he 
concluded that neither the Order nor its implementing regula- 
tions should apply to NOPSI.4D 
This Case Note examines the scope of authority granted to 
an administrator in implementing the provisions of an executive 
order and considers the contractual relationship that exists be- 
tween NOPSI and the government. In addition, the implications 
the Order apply only to those contracts entered into subsequent to the issuance of the 
Order in 1965. NOPSI7s original agreement to supply the government's NASA facility 
expired according to its own terms in 1970. At that time NASA sought to execute a formal 
agreement with NOPSI including the nondiscrimination provisions of Exec. Order 11,246. 
NOPSI refused, but consented to continue supplying services to NASA in the absence of 
a formal agreement. The lower court concluded that the agreement to continue supplying 
services subjected NOPSI to the Order. Id. a t  462-63. 
The Court of Appeals indicated that although there were no specific contractual 
arrangements between NOPSI and the government, "[tlhe long-standing seller- 
purchaser relationship indisputedly makes NOPSI a government contractor and further 
contractual underpinning is unnecessary for our holding." Id. a t  463 n.3. 
44. Id. a t  469. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. a t  470. NOPSI is the only utility company supplying service to the area where 
the government's NASA Assembly Facility is located. United States v. New Orleans Pub. 
Serv., Inc., 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. a t  6315, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. a t  1090. In the words of 
Judge Ainsworth, the holding was influenced by the fact that NOPSI "(1) enjoys special 
economic advantages, including a monopoly, and (2) sells directly to the Government." 
553 F.2d a t  468. 
47. 553 F.2d a t  476 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
48. Id. at 478. 
49. Id. at 476-78. 
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of the decision are discussed and a rationale presented that would 
support a holding contrary to the one reached in the instant case. 
A. Administrative Interpretation and Implementation of 
Executive Orders 
The regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to 
Executive Order 11,246 state specifically that the Order is bind- 
ing upon utilities providing service to a government agency." 
Thus, an essential question is whether the Secretary exceeded his 
rulemaking authority by including utilities-specifically those 
required by their franchise agreements to supply energy to all 
customers-with those services covered by the Order? 
1. Power of an administrative agency to adopt rules and 
regulations 
Rules issued by an executive agency pursuant to a statute 
have been upheld by the courts as long as the rules have not 
extended beyond the ambit of the legislatively granted authority. 
The Supreme Court in Mourning u. Family Publications Service, 
Inc. stated that "the validity of a regulation promulgated under 
[a statute] will be sustained as long as it is 'reasonably related 
to the purposes of the enabling legislation.' "52 
In the interest of administrative efficiency, the courts have 
indicated that an administrator would be given significant lati- 
tude in promulgating rules under a statute.53 Limitations on this 
discretion have been recognized, however: 
The power of an administrative officer or board to adminis- 
ter a federal statute and to prescribe rules and regulations to 
that end is not the power to make law-for no such power can 
50. 41 C.F.R. $ 60-1.3-1.4(a) (1976), as amended by 42 Fed. Reg. 3457 (1977) and 42 
Fed. Reg. 5978 (1977). 
51. See notes 30-41 and accompanying text supra. 
52. 411 US.  356, 369 (1973). The Court went on to say: 
The standard to be applied in determining whether the Board exceeded the 
authority delegated to it under the Truth in Lending Act is well established 
under our prior cases. Where the empowering provision of a statute states simply 
that the agency may "make . . . such rules and regulations as may be necessary 
to carry out the provisions of this Act," we have held that the validity of a 
regulation promulgated thereunder will be sustained as long as it is "reasonably 
related to the purposes of the enabling legislation." 
Id. (quoting Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 280-81 (1969)) (footnote omitted). 
53. See note 59 and accompanying text infra. 
6731 CASE NOTE 681 
be delegated by Congress-but the power to adopt regulations 
to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by statute.5J 
Regulations issued pursuant to an executive order have also been 
held valid, although the latitude which an administrator enjoys 
in promulgating such regulations is less clearly defined? 
One may conclude that the courts apply a standard to regu- 
lations under executive orders similar to that applied to regula- 
tions issued pursuant to statute." In upholding the regulations 
under Executive Order 11,246, the court in Contractors Associa- 
tion v. Secretaly of Labor indicated that "[a]dministrative ac- 
tion pursuant to an Executive Order is invalid and subject to 
judicial review if beyond the scope of the Executive Order."57 
Still, the question remains whether regulations under executive 
orders should be given "great deference" in determining whether 
they fall within the scope of the order. 
2. Validity of the regulations i n  the instant case 
After citing the guideline set forth by the Contractors 
Association court, the NOPSI majority indicated that in deter- 
mining whether the regulations were within the scope of the 
Order, the court was bound to give "special deference to the 
Labor Department's interpretati~n."~~ Each of the three cases 
which the court cited as authority for granting special deference," 
however, involved administrative rulings and interpretations is- 
sued pursuant to statutes which specifically granted to an agency 
authority over the issue in question.60 In the instant case, the 
regulations were issued pursuant to an executive order; there is 
54. Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936). Accord, 
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,213-14 (1976); Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 
68, 74 (1965). 
55. See notes 58-62 and accompanying text infra. 
56. See Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955). 
57. 442 F.2d at 175 (citing Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955)). 
58. 553 F.2d at 465. 
59. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 
(1965); Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 
367 U.S. 396 (1961). 
60. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965), for example, involved an administrative 
interpretation by the Secretary of the Interior of an executive order regarding the use of 
federal land in Alaska. While the Court upheld the interpretation, it noted that the 
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 146, 41 Stat. 437 (current version a t  30 U.S.C. 
$ 0  181-287 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974)) "gave the Secretary of the Interior broad power to 
issue oil and gas leases on public lands." 380 U.S. at 4. While the Court ruled specifically 
on the validity of the Secretary's interpretation of the order, an argument can be made 
that the Secretary's authority was supported by statutory underpinning., 
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no statute expressly empowering the Secretary to issue such regu- 
l a t ion~ .~ '  Thus, even though under Contractors Association ad- 
ministrative regulations may be valid if within the scope of an 
executive order, there is no precedent requiring that such regula- 
tions be given special deference by the court?' 
In the absence of special deference, a court could well con- 
clude that the regulations involved in the instant case are outside 
the scope of Executive Order 11,246. First, the Order mentions 
only contracts, yet the regulations apply whether a formal con- 
tract exists or not; an agreement to supply services is sufficient. 
Second, the regulations eliminate the requirement of consent-a 
necessary element of an enforceable contractM-with respect to 
utilities that are required by their local franchises to supply ser- 
vice to all who request it.64 Finally, the strength of the Order 
derives from the economic incentive to comply with its provisions 
in exchange for lucrative government contracts. Because the reg- 
ulations apply to utilities that have no choice in accepting the 
government's business, the force of the Order is changed from 
contractual leverage to sovereign authority. These three argu- 
ments are examined in the following sections. 
B. Contract Law 
1. Applicability of general contract principles to government 
contracts 
Judge Clark dissented on the grounds that the Secretary ex- 
ceeded the scope of his authority by applying the Order to all 
< 4 agreements," rather than limiting its coverage to formal con- 
tracts, and that a contract as commonly understood in the law 
did not exist between NOPSI and the g o ~ e r n m e n t . ~ ~  Judge 
Clark's opinion emphasized the importance of following general 
61. The courts have premised the Secretary of Labor's authority to draft the regula- 
tions on the power granted by $ 201 of the Order. See, e.g., United States v. New Orleans 
Pub. Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d 459, 463 (5th Cir. 1977), petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 
3243 (U.S. Sept. 30,1977) (No. 77-497); Contractors Ass'n. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 
159, 171 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971). 
62. Support for not extending that deference lies in the judicial hesitation to permit 
executive rulemaking where Congress has not specifically extended that authority. See 
Remmert, Executive Order 11,246: Executive Encroachment, 55 A.B.A.J. 1037 (1969). 
63. 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS $$ 3, 9, 11, 12 (1963); 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 99 1, 
2, 18, 22 (3d ed. 1957). 
64. United States v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d 459, 469 (5th Cir. 1977), 
petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Sept. 30, 1977) (No. 77-497). See note 84 
infra. 
65. 553 F.2d at  476. 
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contract principles in determining the relationship between 
NOPSI and the government. Such a course, he contended, would 
have led to a finding by the court that NOPSI was not a party to 
a contract as commonly u n d e r ~ t o o d . ~ ~  While not specifically ad- 
dressing this contention, the majority avoided the argument by 
asserting that "[glovernment contracts are different from con- 
tracts between ordinary persons."67 Although the authority cited 
by the courtaR supports this proposition, it does so only in those 
instances where an exception to general contract law has been 
provided for by a statute or regulation6g that existed at  the time 
the enforceable contract was executed.70 In the absence of such an 
exception, general contract principles apply: "It is customary, 
where Congress has not adopted a different standard, to apply to 
the construction of government contracts the principles of general 
contract law."71 Had the court in the instant case applied general 
contract principles, a different result would have been reached. 
2. Absence of  valid consideration for a contract between NOSPI 
and the  government 
NOPSI's franchise with the city requires the utility to supply 
power to any requesting party located within NOPSI'S area of 
coverage.72 Thus, as Judge Clark argued, NOPSI was supplying 
power to the government because of a preexisting legal duty aris- 
ing out of NOPSI's contract with the city. Because a promise to 
render a performance already required is not sufficient considera- 
tion for a return promise,73 any promise by the government in 
exchange for NOPSI's services would be ~nenforceable .~~ There- 
fore, Judge Clark concluded, there exists no mutuality of obliga- 
66. Id. at  476-79. 
67. Id. at  469. 
68. M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Vacketta 
& Wheeler, A Government Contractor's Right to Abandon Performance, 65 GEO. L.J. 27 
(1976). 
69. See M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289, 1299-1301 (D.C. Cir. 1971); 
Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514, 517-18 (1923). 
70. Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514, 517-18 (1923). 
71. Priebe & Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 411 (1947). Priebe presented the 
question of whether a provision in a government contract for liquidated damages should 
be denied enforcement on the grounds that i t  constituted a penalty. Citing the common 
and useful function of liquidated damages in commercial transactions, the Court ruled 
that such damages were reasonable and enforceable. Id. at  410-12. Accord, Security Life 
& Accident Ins. Co. v. United States, 357 F.2d 145, 148 (5th Cir. 1966). 
72. 553 F.2d at  469. 
73. 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS 1) 143 (1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 76A 
(Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, rev. & edited 1973); 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 132 (3d ed. 1957). 
74. United States v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d a t  478. 
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tion between NOPSI and the government, and as a result no 
contract could have been formed.75 For an enforceable contract 
between NOPSI and the government to be created, NOPSI would 
have to agree to do more than merely fulfill its preexisting legal 
duty.76 Although the argument of lack of valid consideration pro- 
vides one means for reaching an opposite decision, a more com- 
pelling argument is the absence of consent by the utility. 
3. The element of consent 
A fundamental element of all contracts is mutuality of assent 
and agreement to all the terms of the contract.77 The majority in 
NOPSI, however, held that agreement to certain conditions is 
unnecessary "where regulations apply and require the inclusion 
of a contract clause in every contract . . . even if it has not been 
expressly included in a written contract or agreed to by the par- 
ties."78 The court cited ample authority for this ~ontention.~VI'he 
instant case may be distinguished, however, by the fact that the 
aggrieved parties in the cited cases actively sought to enter into 
contracts to perform services for the government after the regula- 
tions in question had been issued, while NOPSI never entered 
into a contract with the government subsequent to the issuance 
of the Order. Although the NOPSI court found that the providing 
of utility services to the government was evidence of a contract,80 
the fact remains that NOPSI never consented to the terms which 
the government sought to impose. 
C. Implications of the NOPSI Decision 
With the decision in NOPSI, the government has been 
granted the authority in certain instances to impose additional 
terms and conditions subsequent to the original agreement of the 
party without the government assuming additional duties. This 
authority is an extremely powerful tool that would ordinarily be 
75. Id. 
76. Id. See 1A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS Q 192 (1963); 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 4 132 
(3d ed. 1957). 
77. See 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS Q 3 (1963); 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS Q 1 (3d ed. 
1957). 
78. 553 F.2d at 469. 
79. Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514 (1923); M. Steinthal & Co. 
v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1971); J.W. Bateson Co. v. United States, 162 Ct. 
C1. 566 (1963); G.L. Christian & Assoc. v. United States, 312 F.2d 418 (Ct. Cl.), cert. 
denied, 375 U.S. 954 (1963). 
80. 553 F.2d at 469. 
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denied to any contracting party. The court's willingness to extend 
such a power evidences a strong desire to (1) eliminate discrimi- 
natory employment practices and (2) protect the government 
from being forced to do business with those who may engage in 
such practices. While the objectives of the government in the 
instant case are laudable, the granting of such a formidable 
weapon presents significant implications which the court should 
have considered. 
I .  Administrative authority in interpreting executive orders 
The decision suggests that administrators are given a sub- 
stantial degree of freedom in implementing executive orders, even 
in the absence of explicit statutory authorization, and that strict 
interpretation is not required to establish a regulation's validity. 
While the limits on such administrative action are not yet clearly 
defined, the instant case would seem to represent judicial ap- 
proval of this previously untested exercise of executive authority. 
2. The force of the Order before and after NOPSI 
The considerable federal purchasing power makes the gov- 
ernment an  attractive customer to many private contractors. 
Compliance with terms or conditions not encountered in the 
course of ordinary business is a price that most contractors will- 
ingly pay in exchange for the government's business? I t  is the 
government's strong economic bargaining position that provides 
the force behind the nondiscrimination requirements of the var- 
ious executive orders and that  gives the government another 
means of achieving desirable national  objective^.^^ 
The decision in the instant case represents a shift away from 
the traditional use of contractual leverage in achieving govern- 
ment objectives. As the dictum in Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co. 
suggests," the power of the government to fix certain terms and 
conditions upon which it will deal derives not from its sovereign 
81. Evidence of this is found in the large amount of business conducted between the 
government and the private sector. Despite the stated intention of the Secretary of Labor 
to enforce the nondiscrimination provisions, only 14 companies have been debarred from 
government contracts. See [I9771 FED. CONT. REP. (BNA) No. 686, A-9, No. 694, C-1. 
82. "The fundamental principle underlying the Presidential power to require nondis- 
crimination by contractors is found in the power of the Federal Government to set condi- 
tions upon [sic] which anyone desiring to do business with the United States must 
meet." Joyce vTMcCrane, 320 F. Supp. 1284, 1290 (D.N.J. 1970) (emphasis added). 
83. 310 U.S. 113, 127 (1940). For the language of the Court, see text accompanying 
note 21 supra. 
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authority but rather from the freedom to contract that every indi- 
vidual enjoys. NOPSI significantly broadens executive authority 
beyond that of contractual leverage. The elements of choice or 
consent that were present in all previously litigated cases involv- 
ing government contractors and Executive Order 11,246 are ab- 
sent in the instant case.R4 By way of contrast, it is extremely 
doubtful that any private party receiving service from NOPSI 
could require this type of performance by NOPSI. Therefore, with 
respect to businesses that are required by their state or local 
franchise to provide service to the government, i t  is clear that the 
force of the Order is not one of simple economics, but represents, 
under the guise of contract law, an exercise of the federal govern- 
ment's sovereign power in pursuit of certain national objectives. 
3. An alternative solution 
A decision for NOPSI in the instant case would not have 
thwarted the nondiscrimination objectives of the Executive 
Order. The majority indicated that  a decision favorable to 
NOPSI would have forced upon the government the dilemma of 
either acquiescing or going without the necessary services.85 The 
court reasoned that "a valid and important nationwide federal 
program . . . could be nullified by any seller with a monopoly in 
a service," supply or property needed by the Government, just by 
84. The court concedes that NOPSI never consented to the nondiscrimination provi- 
sions. 553 F.2d at  469. The court suggests that NOPSI's original agreement with the city 
to supply utility services to the area committed NOPSI to the provisions: "Acceptance of 
the benefits of the local franchises subjected NOPSI to the obligations attached thereto 
. . . . When NOPSI undertook to satisfy those obligations by selling energy to the Gov- 
ernment, the company did so according to the terms imposed by the Government." Id. 
at 467-70 (citation omitted). 
It is interesting to note that the NOPSI franchise was granted in 1922,43 years prior 
to the Executive Order. United States v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. 
at 6315,8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. a t  1090. The court seems to suggest that NOPSI's original 
acceptance of the franchise operates as objective consent to all duties that may arise as a 
result of the franchise, even though in the instant case subjective consent by NOPSI is 
clearly absent. While this raises the issue of subjective versus objective consent (see 
Bronaugh, Agreement, Mistake, .and Objectivity in the Bargain Theory of Contract, 18 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 213 (1976); Samek, The Objective Theory of Contract and the Rule 
in L'Estrange v. Graucob, 52 CAN. B. REV. 351 (1974)), it is unreasonable to suggest that 
NOPSI's acceptance of the franchise operates as consent to terms imposed later, not by 
the city which granted the franchise, but by a customer, the federal government. 
85. 553 F.2d at  470. 
86. The majority emphasized that it was NOPSI's monopolistic position that necessi- 
tated a holding for the government. An interesting question arises when one considers a 
possible situation where the government needs services in an area where there exists an 
oligopoly with regard to the desired services, and each member of the oligopoly refuses to 
comply with the provisions of the Executive Order. If, for example, there were two utilities 
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virtue of the seller's economic p ~ s i t i o n . " ~ ~  However, had the 
Order and regulations been held inapplicable to NOPSI in this 
case, the objectives of the Executive Order would not have been 
nullified with respect to those contractors who have sought gov- 
ernment contracts. A decision favorable to NOPSI would pertain 
only to businesses whose relationship with the government re- 
sulted from the government's right to compel the contractor's 
service according to the conditions of a preexisting state or local 
franchise. 
In addition, a holding for NOPSI would not have given the 
utility the opportunity to engage in discriminatory employment 
practices. There are other means available to the government to 
prevent abuse by employers. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964," employers such as NOPSI are barred from engaging 
in employment d i s c r i m i n a t i ~ n . ~ ~  Employees, their representa- 
tives, or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission can 
file a charge alleging abuse by an employer.g0 If the employer fails 
to enter into a conciliation agreement within 30 days after the 
charge is filed, the Commission may bring a civil action against 
the ~ffender.~'  If a court finds the employer has intentionally 
engaged in an unlawful employment practice, "the court may 
enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employ- 
ment practice, and order affirmative action as may be appropri- 
ate."92 Thus, NOPSI would still be required to observe lawful 
employment procedures even without the force of Executive 
Order 11,246. 
capable of servicing NASA's facility and both refused to comply, could the government 
both require service and force compliance? Following the reasoning of the NOPSI major- 
ity, such a result is conceivable. As the court indicated, if a utility were allowed to prevail, 
"the Government would have to either acquiesce or else go without necessary services. 
Obviously a local utility cannot force such a dilemma upon the Government." Id. 
87. Id. 
88. 42 U.S.C. Q Q  2000e, 2000e-1 to -15, 2004, 2005 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974). 
89. Id. Q 2000e-2. An "employer," with minor exceptions not relevant here, is one 
"engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each 
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar 
year. . . ." Id. Q 2000e(b). 
90. Id Q 2000e-5(b). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, created by 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Q 2000e-4(a) (1970), should not be confused with 
the CEEO. Note 16 and accompanying text supra. 
91. Id. Q 2000e-5(f)(l). If the case involves a government, governmental agency, or 
political subdivision, the civil action will be brought by the Attorney General. Id. 
92. Id. Q 2000e-5(g). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The Fifth Circuit's holding demonstrates a willingness to 
allow the executive to impose significant contractual obligations, 
including keeping records, providing the government with access 
to those records, and implementing an affirmative action pro- 
gram,g3 without the consent of the utility. A better reasoned 
course would have been to hold the provisions of Executive Order 
11,246 inapplicable to all public utilities required to provide ser- 
vices to the government because of duties imposed by their state 
or local franchises. Alternative remedies such as Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 196P4 could still be invoked to prevent em- 
ployment discrimination practices. Such a result would have 
maintained the effectiveness of the Executive Order in combating 
discrimination, without unnecessarily extending executive au- 
thority and violating fundamental principles of contract law. 
93. See notes 4-5 and accompanying text supra. 
94. Notes 88-92 and accompanying text supra. 
